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Abstract 
 
 
 Today, autonomous weapons systems promise to make war more precise and effective 
while removing the human component from the battlefield. With the improvement of deep learning 
and computer vision, machines will soon be able to navigate and search through contested 
environments, discriminate between targets, and engage appropriately. The memoirs of drone 
pilots point to the evolving psychological impact of killing caused by the increase in the amount 
of empathy and emotional connectedness that drone pilots develop towards their target during the 
intimate surveillance period. A war fought without “skin-in-the-game” enables drone pilots to 
become better moral agents and decreases the amount of dehumanization inherent in most types 
of combat. The decentralized architecture of remote combat produces a more correct following of 
the Laws of War by reducing the influence of the individual drone pilot. A human on-the-loop 
system promises to reduce the amount of moral injury incurred by drone pilots and maximize the 
efficacy and ethicality of the decision-making process at the same time. 
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Warfare is almost as old as man himself and reaches into the most 
secret places of the human heart, places where self dissolves rational 
purpose, where pride reigns, where emotion is paramount, where 
instinct is king. 
 
– John Keegan, A History of Warfare 
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 5 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 The invention of the Gatling gun marked a dramatic shift in the landscape of war. This 
predecessor of the machine gun increased the deadliness of the individual soldier, allowing him to 
fire munitions of high caliber faster and farther than was previously possible. Richard Gatling, the 
gun’s inventor, wanted to preserve lives by reducing the number of soldiers fighting on the 
battlefield, but he could not have anticipated the increase in the deadliness of war that ensued. 
Although the weapon did serve its purpose of reducing the number of soldiers needed on the 
Gatling-equipped side, the death toll skyrocketed on the rivals’ end. Today, fully autonomous 
weapons systems promise to remove human presence from battlefields altogether – to “select and 
engage without further intervention from a human operator.”1 With the human entirely out-of-the-
loop, fully autonomous weapons systems will observe, decide, and act without any human input, 
free to decide the strategy for achieving a given goal. Although the state of current technology 
does not yet empower the implementation of fully autonomous weapons systems, this impending 
reality has raised many questions and concerns. Semi-autonomous weapons system like the 
Predator Drone, have some degree of autonomy, but retain the human-in-the-loop component, 
which means that a human is still making the decision to act. For the remainder of this thesis, I 
will distinguish between autonomous weapons systems (AWS, or semi-autonomous weapons 
systems) and the purely hypothetical fully autonomous weapons systems. AWS promise a more 
precise and effective war by deploying the individual soldier from behind the safety of her 
computer monitor. With the increase in AWS usage, the debate surrounding what precisely counts 
as a “just war” has produced incredibly divergent opinions. 
 Led by Berkeley Professor Stuart Russel, a campaign to ban the use of AWS conjectures 
that, similarly to what happened with the Gatling gun, AWS could make war more lethal2. Drone 
strikes have become increasingly ubiquitous, raising concerns about the morality of this new 
method of waging of war. One objection to taking the human out of the loop claims that in order 
to handle morally complex situations, it is essential that the agent contextualize the ethical 
problem. In the context of war, this means recognizing an opponent’s humanity and seeing your 
own desires, emotions, and fears, reflected back at you. In other words, this means having skin-in-
the-game. Proponents of this thesis have argued that the Laws of War3 cannot alone guaranty a 
just war, because moral rules are not codifiable. According to this view, skin-in-the-game is 
essential to leading a just war because it allows human soldiers to violate the Laws of War and 
oppose authority if either would cause them to overstep their own moral line. This can mean 
anything from deciding to spare a child combatant4, to refuting the leadership of a genocidal 
dictator. Russell and others contend that because a machine follows a pre-determined set of rules, 
“legal” and “moral” are synonymous to it. 
 
1 Stuart Casey-Maslen et al., “Drones and Other Unmanned Weapons Systems under International Law,” (Leiden: 
Brill Nijhoff, 2018), 123. 
2 See, “Open Letter on Autonomous Weapons,” Future of Life Institute, accessed April 29, 2020, 
https://futureoflife.org/open-letter-autonomous-weapons/?cn-reloaded=1). 
3 See, Department of Defense Law of War Manual (Washington, DC: General Counsel of the Department of 
Defense, 2015)). 
4 Paul Scharre, “Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War” (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2019), 2-4. 
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 Unlike research that has been done in the past, my thesis will evaluate AWS as an 
alternative to the dehumanization consistently found in a war fought with skin-in-the-game. The 
first chapter of this thesis will briefly present the three principles of the Laws of War: necessity, 
proportionality, and distinction, and demonstrate the ways in which AWS might comply, or fail to 
comply, with those principles. I will then briefly expose the anti-codifiability thesis, which states 
that because morality is contextual and inexhaustive, it does not translate into programming form. 
Rather than attempt to refute this argument, I will show that morality, as defined in this manner, 
is not easily or commonly exercised by the traditional soldier. I will make my claim by evaluating 
the role of soldiers’ biological predispositions against killing in preventing a just war from being 
fought. Finally, Paul Scharre’s and other drone pilots’ memoirs will provide the basis for an 
analysis of the effects of removing a combatant’s “fear of death.” These memoirs contain evidence 
that delegating certain high-stakes and high-pressure decisions to machines could make war more 
precise, effective, and ultimately result in less incidental bloodshed. AWS are not limited by 
human soldier’s physiological and psychological constraints: they come in all shapes and sizes, 
can loiter for days performing reconnaissance, and execute risky operations. Ultimately, I conclude 
that AWS are an opportunity to surpass our own shortcomings in war, by removing the human 
component from the battlefield. For the purpose of this thesis, I will remain within the realm of 
available evidence; extreme scenarios such as Stuart Russell’s “slaughter bots” will be out of the 
scope of this investigation. I will use the memoirs of drone pilots and other scholarly works to 
investigate the morality of a remote war, and, having made my claim that the human component 
should be removed from the physical battlefield, I will attempt to home in on the optimal role for 
the human component within the war. 
 
Chapter One: Autonomous Weapons Systems Towards a More 
Accurate Implementation of the Laws of War 
 
 
 
 Given present-day technological advancements, AWS will soon be able to abide by the 
Laws of War with un-precedented precision and speed. The Laws of War5 (or Jus in Bello) are a 
body of military governance that regulates army conduct during a conflict. This globally endorsed 
set of rules provides the perfect framework on which to build a goal-driven AWS because it is 
universally recognized and provides a legal description of a just war. Principally, the Laws of War 
demand that all parties follow three guiding principles: necessity, proportionality, and distinction. 
Necessity demands that all potential targets have military value. Distinction requires that parties 
distinguish between legitimate targets and civilians. Finally, if the first two precepts have been 
fulfilled, the principle of proportionality demands that the anticipated collateral damage be 
proportional to the military value of the target. The Laws of War prohibit weapons that cannot be 
used fully in accordance with these principles, including indiscriminate weapons and weapons 
which are of a nature to cause “superfluous injury of unnecessary suffering.”6 As a result of this, 
 
5 See, Department of Defense Law of War Manual (Washington, DC: General Counsel of the Department of 
Defense, 2015)). 
6 Stuart Casey-Maslen et al., “Drones and Other Unmanned Weapons Systems under International Law,” (Leiden: 
Brill Nijhoff, 2018), 100. 
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many “unlawful” weapons have been banned, including, but not limited to, land mines, poisonous 
gases, blinding laser weapons, and biological weapons.7 Many researchers believe that AWS 
belong in this category; this chapter seeks to expose the present day uses of and advancements in 
AWS. In a 2013 interview, Peter Maurer, the president of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, stated that “from the perspective of international humanitarian law, any weapon that makes 
it possible to carry out more precise attacks and helps avoid or minimize incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects, should be given preference over weapons 
that do not.”8 Given this, my aim is not to show that AWS can perfectly follow the Laws of War, 
but rather that they can implement them with a consistently higher degree of accuracy than human 
soldiers and manned weapons. 
 The principle of distinction demands that “parties to an armed conflict distinguish between 
civilian persons and civilian objects on the one hand, and combatants and military objectives on 
the other, demanding they direct their operations only against combatants and military 
objectives.”9 Conforming to this principle depends primarily on an agent’s information- gathering 
and analyzing effectiveness. Although AWS capabilities do not yet extend to the differentiation of 
individual persons, computers have been able to identify cooperative targets for quite some time10. 
Cooperative targets emit a secure signal and can be contrasted with non-cooperative targets, which 
do not broadcast their location, and are therefore harder to track. For example, the Israeli Harpy 
drone11 can loiter over a predefined area for hours on end, searching for enemy radar emissions. 
Search-and-attack loitering munitions like Harpy or Raytheon’s JSM/NSM cruise missile12 have a 
pre-programmed target which they autonomously find and identify before engaging it, all 
performed without human intervention. Identifying a non-cooperative target is harder to do than 
homing in on a radar signal, and therefore demands more advanced technological capabilities. 
 Paul Scharre , Senior fellow and Director of the Technology and National Security Program 
at the Center for a New American Security, identifies three requirements for building an 
autonomous-targeting weapon – “the ability to maneuver intelligently through the environment to 
search; the ability to discriminate among potential targets to identify the correct ones; and the 
ability to engage targets, presumably through force.”13 Scharre’s third requirement is already 
implemented today – remotely piloted aircrafts (RPAs) like the Reaper Drone or the Predator 
Drone are a perfect example of this, with their ability to effectively engage and destroy targets14. 
As for the ability to navigate and search surroundings, deep learning neural networks have 
significantly improved computer vision over the past few years. In 2015 Microsoft’s deep neural 
network technology performed object-recognition tasks with an error rate of 3.57 percent, beating 
 
7 Stuart Casey-Maslen et al., “Drones and Other Unmanned Weapons Systems under International Law,” (Leiden: 
Brill Nijhoff, 2018), 100-101. 
8 “The Use of Armed Drones Must Comply with Laws,” ICRC, May 10, 2013, 
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/interview/2013/05-10-drone-weapons-ihl.htm).  
9 Stuart Casey-Maslen et al., “Drones and Other Unmanned Weapons Systems under International Law,” (Leiden: 
Brill Nijhoff, 2018), 101. 
10 Paul Scharre, “Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War” (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2019), 84-88. 
11 See, iai.co.il, accessed May 27, 2020, https://www.iai.co.il/p/harpy). 
12 See, Slijper, Frank, and Pax (Organization), “Slippery Slope: The Arms Industry and Increasingly Autonomous 
Weapons”, (2019. https://www.paxforpeace.nl/publications/all-publications/slippery-slope), 17-18. 
13 Paul Scharre, “Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War” (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2019), 123. 
14 Bergen et al. “Drone Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law, and Policy” (New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015), 119. 
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humans at this task by over 1.5%15. Visual-aided navigation (tracking of the “optical flow”16) 
paired with inertial measurement units (sensing “changes in velocities”17) have enabled drones to 
explore the indoors and outdoors without the help of GPS. Using the positions and velocities of 
the objects around it, drones can form an internal representation of their surroundings. Shield AI’s 
Nova class of artificially intelligent unmanned aerial systems (AI-UAS) are an example of fully 
autonomous indoor and outdoor navigation that operates even in cluttered, pitch dark, GPS- and 
comms-denied environments18. Developing AWS’ visual capabilities is necessary for 
distinguishing between a legitimate military target and a civilian target, which requires identifying 
attributes like “clothing, activity, age, and gender” for a person, and “movement, size, shape, color, 
spacing, and speed”19 for an object. 
 Scharre’s second capability, target recognition, is by far the most challenging to develop 
in AWS, because the Laws of War provide a very broad definition of what constitutes a legitimate 
target. Indeed, they define the latter as a combatant who is currently participating in the aggression, 
or an object of military value20. However, the archetype of the legitimate combatant is inconstant 
and contextual, so it is nigh-impossible to program a perfectly accurate representation into an 
AWS, just as it is extremely difficult for soldiers to navigate the fog of war. Although the Geneva 
Conventions require that legitimate combatants bear a “fixed distinctive insignia recognizable at a 
distance in order to distinguish themselves from non-combatants,”21 this rule is not followed in 
most modern combats, which makes it difficult to know whether a person is a civilian or a 
legitimate combatant at that moment. In addition, all enemies do not deserve the same treatment: 
for example, combatants can become “hors de combat” (if they are wounded, or surrender) at any 
time and should not be targeted. Current technologies for recognizing non-cooperative targets 
include synthetic aperture radars (SAR)22 that generate grainy pictures from overhead radar pulses. 
SAR produces images that are very hard to analyze for present-day advanced target recognition 
(ATR) algorithms and has mainly been used for finding and identifying cooperative targets23. The 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is currently working on a program called 
“Target Recognition and Adaptation in Contested Environments” (TRACE) to improve current 
ATR algorithms by mobilizing the progress made in computer vision using deep neural networks24. 
From a hardware perspective, drones present an opportunity to better adhere to the principle of 
distinction, with their ability to follow targets for long periods of time collecting tactical 
information. An RPA’s size, speed, and flight-capabilities make it an ideal candidate for navigating 
the ‘fog of war’ present in all kinds of warfare. 
 
15 Paul Scharre, “Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War” (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2019), 87. 
16 Bergen et al. “Drone Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law, and Policy” (New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015), 122. 
17 Ibid., 123. 
18 See, “Nova,” Shield AI, accessed May 4, 2020, https://www.shield.ai/nova) for an action video of Nova AI-UAS. 
19 Bergen et al. “Drone Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law, and Policy” (New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015), 103. 
20 Stuart Casey-Maslen et al., “Drones and Other Unmanned Weapons Systems under International Law,” (Leiden: 
Brill Nijhoff, 2018), 102-104. 
21 Bergen et al. “Drone Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law, and Policy” (New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015), 124. 
22 Paul Scharre, “Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War” (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2019), 86. 
23 Ibid., 86. 
24 Ibid., 84-88. 
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 In their 2009 work25, professors and roboethicists Ronald Arkin, Patrick Ulan, and Brittany 
Duncan proposed a model for building an ethical AWS. At the core of their model is the Ethical 
Governor, which calculates the lawfulness of the lethal actions generated by the AWS. The set of 
constraints referred to by the governor is derived from the Laws of War (stored in long-term 
memory) and the rules of engagement specific to a particular mission (stored in short-term 
memory). The evidential reasoning component of the system takes in the perceptual data gathered 
by the system and converts it into logical affirmations so that these can be used to query the 
constraints database. These logical affirmations describe (a) the target, (b) the surroundings and 
(c) the chosen behavioral response. In order to judge whether or not an action is permissible, the 
governor retrieves the set of constraints from short- and long-term memory and divides them into 
two categories: Cforbidden and Cobligate. Constraints are derived from the principles of distinction, 
necessity, proportionality, and others.  The interpreter must then “evaluate all of the constraints in 
Cforbidden to be false”26; evaluating even one Cforbidden constraint to be true means that the lethal 
behavior is not permissible. If this condition is satisfied, at least one constraint in Cobligate must 
evaluate to true in order to proceed (i.e. the lethal behavior must be necessary). If either constraint 
(Cforbidden or Cobligate) is not satisfied, then lethal action is restrained, and the AWS is instructed to 
continue its mission without engaging the target. If both constraints are satisfied, the governor 
must now ensure that the expected damage is proportional to the expected military value (principle 
of proportionality). The collateral damage estimator does this by “optimizing the likelihood of 
target neutralization while minimizing any potential collateral damage that would result from 
engaging the target with lethal force.”27 This process is performed by the collateral damage 
estimator, which attempts to minimize damage by performing a risk analysis on every possible 
weapon at every position that does not violate Cforbidden and choosing the one that produces the 
least amount of damage. Collateral damage is calculated based on expected infrastructure damage 
and number of casualties. We can imagine modifying this algorithm to take other variables into 
account, for example damage to the environment. If the minimum damage is too high given the 
military necessity level of the target, the lethal action is aborted, else, the AWS has permission to 
engage its target. 
 What this chapter shows is that current research and advancements in AWS technology are 
trying to produce a more just war by enabling a more precise following of the Laws of War. There 
is no scenario in which a human soldier with skin-in-the-game could perform the calculations 
achieved by Arkin et al.’s ethical governor within the time constraint of war. Although their 
architecture is purely experimental, there is no reason why we could not soon see a real 
implementation of a similar model. Such an enhancement of the process of identifying, validating, 
and engaging potential targets would dramatically reduce the casualties of war. If AWS do indeed 
have the potential to reduce the costs of war, then, according to the International Humanitarian 
Laws, they should be adopted. The following chapter identifies potential philosophical reasons 
why an AWS could not wage a just war entirely on its own. In particular, it presents the argument 
that a just war necessitates that human soldiers have skin-in-the-game. 
 
 
25 See, Ronald C. Arkin et al, “An Ethical Governor for Constraining Lethal Action in an Autonomous System:,” 
(Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, January 1, 2009). 
26 Ronald C. Arkin et al, “An Ethical Governor for Constraining Lethal Action in an Autonomous System:,” (Fort 
Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, January 1, 2009), 4. 
27 Ibid., 5. 
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Chapter Two: Morality – Uncodified Governing Principle of War 
 
 
 
 Many thinkers believe that if morality and empathy are inherently human qualities, armed 
robots should not be deployed onto the battlefield, even if they are fully equipped to adhere to the 
rules of war. The impetus for this argument is that legality and morality are essentially different 
concepts. In their recent work28, Duncan Purves, Ryan Jenkins, and Bradley Strawser define three 
categories of mistakes that a machine can make. The empirical mistake comes from a failure to 
adequately identify the facts of a situation. Machines make moral mistakes when they are in 
possession of all the facts, but they are unable to come to the right normative decision. Finally, the 
system can make a practical mistake by reacting inappropriately given an apt normative decision29. 
The improvement of computer vision and weapon precision will likely enable machines to make 
fewer empirical and practical mistakes than human soldiers. However, Purves et al. argue that 
machines will always make more moral mistakes than humans. The reason for this is what they 
call the anti-codifiability thesis: “the true moral theory could [not] be captured in universal rules 
that the morally uneducated person could competently apply to any situation.”30 This view is based 
on notions of Aristotelian rationality, which holds that a morally “right” decision is contextual, 
interpretative, and dependent on the particulars (observed from a subjective point of view) of a 
dilemma or situation. If this is true, the ability to be morally rational is an inherently human quality 
that cannot be carried out by rule-based logic31. Given this, Purves et al. believe that as long as AI 
is the “product of a discrete list of instructions provided by humans,”32 machines will never possess 
the kind of moral judgement required for moral agency. 
   Philosophers talk about skin-in-the-game as an essential component for leading a just war 
because humans have a strong biological inhibition against killing that prevents us from readily 
taking a fellow human being’s life. The concern is then that machines, which may not feel empathy 
towards humans, will not be restrained by any reticence to harm. In his 2014 book, Lieutenant 
Colonel Dave Grossman writes that “looking another human being in the eye, making an 
independent decision to kill him, and watching as he dies due to your action combine to form one 
of the most basic, important, primal, and potentially traumatic occurrences of war.”33 According 
to Grossman, even fighter pilots, who are in the air and therefore further away from their targets, 
hesitate to pull the trigger: “when it came time to kill, they looked into the cockpit at another man, 
a pilot, a flier, one of the ‘brotherhood of the air’, a man frighteningly like themselves; and when 
faced with such a man it is possible that the vast majority simply could not kill him.”34 Overcoming 
this psychological predisposition against killing requires intense pressure from authority and can 
 
28 See, Duncan Purves, Ryan Jenkins, and Bradley Strawser, “Autonomous Machines, Moral Judgment, and Acting 
for the Right Reasons,” (Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18, no. 4 (August 2015)). 
29 Ibid., 859. 
30 See, Duncan Purves, Ryan Jenkins, and Bradley Strawser, “Autonomous Machines, Moral Judgment, and Acting 
for the Right Reasons,” (Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18, no. 4 (August 2015)), 855-856. 
31 Ryan C. Jenkins et al., « Who Should Die?: the Ethics of Killing in War”, (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2018)., 169. 
32 Duncan Purves, Ryan Jenkins, and Bradley Strawser, “Autonomous Machines, Moral Judgment, and Acting for 
the Right Reasons,” (Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18, no. 4 (August 2015)), 857. 
33 Dave Grossman, “On Killing: the Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society,” (New York, NY: 
Open Road Integrated Media, 2014), 55. 
34 Ibid., 54. 
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lead to soldiers suffering from debilitating moral injury, having crossed their own moral boundary 
by doing something that violated what they considered to be right. In another chapter of his book, 
Grossman talks about the “decrease in reality”35 that accompanies distancing oneself from an 
assault. When soldiers are operating from a removed location, it becomes harder to empathize with 
their target, which lowers emotional engagement and psychological inhibitions against lethal 
action. Armin Krishnan calls “adiaphorization” the process of disassociating means from ends 
when soldiers lose sight of the consequences of their actions. If Grossman and others are right that 
resistance to killing is directly proportional to the physical distance from the target, then drone 
pilots should experience very little difficulty to kill. 
 Distance from the target, however, is not the only way of overcoming one’s biological 
inhibitions to kill. In his book Less Than Human, Professor David Livingstone Smith investigates 
killology on the battlefield and explains the causes and effects of dehumanization in war. He 
defines dehumanization as “the act of conceiving of people as subhuman creatures rather than as 
human beings.”36 When soldiers dehumanize their opponents in war, they are not just making a 
comparison between them and something less than human, they actually believe that their enemy 
is sub-human and should be treated accordingly. This results from the notion of their being a “great 
chain of Being”37 with God at the top and lifeless things at the bottom. Although this theory is 
completely unscientific and disproved by Darwinism, it is still present in today’s rhetoric, as we 
talk about certain organism being higher or lower than others on an imaginary scale, generally 
with humans at the top of it. Psychoanalyst Erik Erikson talks about cultural pseudospeciation38 
to denote the formation of distinct identities and cultures within human race, each with a tendency 
to believe they are superior from the rest. Pseudospeciation paired with the concept of a “great 
chain of Being” creates an imagined hierarchy within the human race and is essential to the notion 
of dehumanization because it results in the lowering of certain groups to a sub-human status. Being 
able to conceive of the enemy as “sub-human” acts as a “psychological lubricant, dissolving 
[soldiers’] inhibitions and inflaming [their] destructive passions, […] empower[ing] [them] to 
perform acts that would, under other circumstances, be unthinkable.”39 In high pressure situations, 
fear for one’s life, coupled with military propaganda and intense conditioning, can turn into hate 
and dehumanization of the enemy.  
 When philosophers and scientists talk about machines “dehumanizing” war, they are 
defining the term in a very different way than Smith does. Reducing someone or a group of people 
to a set of numbers and rules (i.e. lines of code in a program) takes away that person’s or group’s 
individuality, but not necessarily their humanity. The example most commonly used to illustrate 
the difference between these two states of mind is the doctor in her operating room – in order to 
do her job competently she needs to regard the patient on her table as mere flesh and bones. In 
doing so, the surgeon disregards her patient’s individuality but does not consider her patient as 
sub-human. Although the process of dehumanization is not fully understood, this form of self-
deception enables soldiers to believe that they are morally justified in committing atrocious acts 
against their peers. This phenomenon is further reinforced by group solidarity and camaraderie 
found in military units – soldiers have often adopted dehumanizing expressions to designate the 
 
35 Dave Grossman, “On Killing: the Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society,” (New York, NY: 
Open Road Integrated Media, 2014), 109. 
36 Ibid., 26. 
37 Ibid., 39. 
38 Ibid., 63. 
39 Ibid., 13. 
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enemy. We see instances of this in all kinds of conflicts throughout history. During the holocaust 
Jews were thought of as “rats” and “cockroaches” by German soldiers and experimented on in 
horrific ways like the lowliest of lab rats. The Allied forces during WWII called the Nazis “dogs,” 
and the Japanese were equated to “monkeys, apes, or rodents.”40 The Japanese dehumanized their 
Chinese rivals, who they considered “chancorro,”41 meaning sub-human or bug-like. Their foreign 
enemies were often represented with devilish features, like horns, and they were called “monsters” 
and “devils.” Dehumanization is not a thing of the past; some present-day examples include US 
soldiers posing with dead Afghan soldiers’ body parts as if they were game animals, or drone pilots 
referring to their targets as “ants” on a screen42. 
 The anti-codifiability thesis assumes that our capacity to rationalize remains intact in 
situations of high pressure, like during a war. If this were the case, then Aristotelian rationality 
would be valuable in order to properly weigh the life of another human being. Skin-in-the-game 
plays into this thesis because, ideally, it immerses the soldier fully into the scene and provides her 
with the necessary subjectivity and psychological connectedness to make a correct moral 
judgement. This skill is essential to preserving humanity when taking a fellow soldier’s life. These 
two ideas work together to create the ideal soldier, better equipped than machines to make moral 
judgements. In a recent podcast, Paul Scharre acknowledges a gap between “the reality of war and 
the fantasy that society tells itself to allow us to send men and women off to war.” 43 He highlights 
the life-altering PTSD that many army veterans suffer from, frequently resulting in divorce, 
alcohol abuse, and sometimes suicides. In a 2006 report44, US Soldiers deployed in Iraq 
demonstrated that they had at best a very feeble grasp of how to behave ethically and lawfully in 
war. Only 47% of Soldiers agreed that “all non-combatants should be treated with dignity and 
respect.”45 They were also asked whether or not they insulted non-combatants (yes - Soldiers 
28%), and damaged or destroyed civilian objects unnecessarily (yes - Soldiers 9%)46. Moreover, 
around 40% of Soldiers who reported insulting non-combatants also said that in the moment they 
were experiencing high levels of anger and had also known traumatic combat experiences such as 
the death of a comrade or having to handle dead body remains47. Finally, less than half of Soldiers 
said that they would report a comrade’s unethical behavior48. The reality is that humans are not 
perfect moral and rational soldiers and, in addition to empirical and practical mistakes, they 
frequently make moral ones too. In the fog of war, soldiers’ decision-making capabilities are often 
obstructed by feelings of revenge for lost comrades, weak leadership, dehumanization of the 
enemy, and poorly trained troops. Memoirs of drone pilots provide us with the perfect opportunity 
 
40 Dave Grossman, “On Killing: the Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society,” (New York, NY: 
Open Road Integrated Media, 2014), 18. 
41 Ibid., 18. 
42 Ed Pilkington, “Life as a Drone Operator: 'Ever Step on Ants and Never Give It Another Thought?’,” (The 
Guardian, Guardian News and Media, November 19, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/18/life-
as-a-drone-pilot-creech-air-force-base-nevada). 
43 See, Paul Scharre, interview with Lucas Perry, AI Alignment Podcast: On Lethal Autonomous Weapons with Paul 
Scharre, podcast audio, March 16, 2020, https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-future-of-
life/id1170991978?i=1000468611509. 
44 See, Office of the Surgeon Multinational Force-Iraq and Office of the Surgeon General (Army), “Final Report of 
the Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT-IV)”, (Washington, DC, 2006, 
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45 Ibid., 35. 
46 Ibid., 36. 
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to compare the morality and rationality of soldiers when they are fighting remotely versus when 
they have skin-in-the-game. In the following chapter I ask whether RPAs make war more just and 
proceed to pinpoint the most appropriate role for the human component in warfare. 
 
Chapter Three: RPAS - Overcoming Our Biological Inhibitions 
Against Killing 
 
 
 
 In 2005, a Predator missile struck its target near the border of Afghanistan. Drone pilot T. 
Mark McCurley was on duty at the Nellis Air Force Base. Conforming with the rules of 
engagement, the strike was an effort to prevent an imminent terrorist attack, and thus constituted 
a lawful act of self-defense. The Predator’s target was a man known as the Facilitator, and 
intelligence gathered for over a month confirmed his status as legitimate target. He died during a 
routine phone call to his wife, the only pattern to which he regularly conformed. After identifying 
the man’s scorched and dismantled body among the wreckage using the Predator’s camera, 
McCurley drove home to cope alone49. In a recent interview, McCurley described this incident as 
his most traumatic and intimate kill50, and recounted the scene vividly, underscoring the moral 
injury that still impacted him years later. Drone pilots are physically distant from the scene, but 
they are emotionally hyper-connected in ways that oftentimes lead to long-term psychological 
trauma. The lack of skin-in-the-game can make remote pilots feel like they are “playing at God,” 
and they often struggle to come to terms with the reality that they decide who lives and who dies 
without ever putting their own lives in danger. This chapter presents further examples of the greater 
intimacy of drone warfare, and highlights the moral injury suffered from not having skin-in-the-
game. Then, I oppose the argument that says that skin-in-the-game is an inherent component of a 
just war, by showing that removing “fear of death” can reduce dehumanization and produce better 
moral agents. Finally, I demonstrate that the current remote model for war produces more ethical 
results and can be extended to remove humans from the decision-making process. 
 The largest part of a drone pilot’s day is Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(ISR). A drone like the Predator has a flight-capacity of around 24 hours51 (22 hours longer than a 
regular piloted aircraft), and drone pilots will sometimes follow a specific target for days or even 
weeks at a time. During this extended spying, drone pilots become accustomed to their target’s 
day-to-day life; one pilot even recalled witnessing a wedding52. In Bergen Rothenberg’s collection 
of interviews, an anonymous drone pilot described the emotional investment characteristic of this 
kind of continued surveillance. He recounted: “you become immersed in their life. You feel like 
you are a part of what they’re doing every single day. So, even if you’re not emotionally engaged 
 
49 Mark T. McCurley and Kevin Maurer, “Hunter Killer: Inside America’s Unmanned Air War” (New York, New 
York: Dutton, an imprint of Penguin Random House LLC, 2015), 130-136. 
50 See, “The Details of Drones, From A Pilot Who Flew Them,” NPR (NPR, November 5, 2015), 
https://www.npr.org/2015/11/05/454907560/the-details-of-drones-from-a-pilot-who-flew-them. 
51 Daniel Rothenberg, “Drone Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law, and Policy” (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), 119. 
52 See, “Drone”, Video File, YouTube, posted by imacanism01, June 9, 2016, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bMyPzoIMmKM. 
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with those individuals, you become a little bit attached. [..] You see everything.”53 Matt J. Martin 
described the vividness of the images and how he began to refer to his Predator drone as an 
extension of himself rather than a foreign object.54 The emotional attachment that drone pilots 
develop towards what they are seeing is further reinforced by the images’ high definition and the 
heightened sense of nearness to the target55. 
 Many people are quick to blame remote warfare for gamifying war and making it more 
trigger friendly, under the assumption that drone pilots are less emotionally aware and connected 
to the consequences of their actions. The claim that remote warfare can feel like a video game is 
not entirely unfounded, and in their memoirs, drone pilots often spoke of initially experiencing the 
images unfolding on their screens as surreal. When performing lethal actions, soldiers sometimes 
experience less moral conflict by using euphemisms, and distance from the conflict can have the 
initial effect of encouraging this type of behavior. With the Predator flying at 20,000 feet, the 
humanity of the moving dots on the screen can be difficult to recognize at first, and ex-serviceman 
Michael Haas denounced the use of colorful language such as “ants”56 to describe indistinguishable 
targets, or “fun-sized terrorists” to indicate the children. In his memoir, drone pilot Matt Martin 
described his emotions during an air strike: “the man wasn’t really a human being. He was so far 
away and only a high-tech image on a computer screen. The moral aspect of it – that I was about 
to assassinate a fellow human being from ambush – didn’t factor in. Not at the moment. Not yet.”57 
In addition to this initial behavior, war, whether conventional or remote, involves deep emotional 
engagement; it is not uncommon for drone pilots to experience overwhelming feelings of 
vengeance and grief. The lag that exists between the moment a pilot calls a kill shot and the instant 
she is cleared to engage can mean the difference between saving innocent people or having to 
watch them die. When the latter outcome is realized, pilots often experience a host of debilitating 
emotions. 
 Unlike manned aircraft pilots who fly away after engaging their target, drone pilots are also 
responsible for providing damage assessment after a strike. Extremely high-quality images vivify 
the scenes of horror that pilots witness when searching through the wreckage in an attempt to 
identify the dismantled body of their target. In Killer Robots, Armin Krishnan comments on the 
evolving psychological impact of killing, noting that “apparently the zoom on the Foster-Miller 
SWORDS robot is so good that it allows the remote operators to even read the name tags of the 
soldiers they are going to kill over a distance of 300 feet between robot and target.”58 McCurley 
notes the psychological impact of locking eyes with the Facilitator through the targeting pod 
seconds before he died. Because drone pilots also act as backup for soldiers on the ground, they 
sometimes have to identify the fallen figures of their friends, and in those instances the 
psychological strain on pilots can be even greater. Because of a drone’s ability to be everywhere, 
 
53 Daniel Rothenberg, “Drone Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law, and Policy” (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), 115. 
54 Matt Martin and Charles W. Sasser, “Predator: The Remote-Control Air War over Iraq and Afghanistan: a Pilot’s 
Story,” (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2010), 34. 
55 See, Press, Eyal. “The Wounds of the Drone Warrior.” The New York Times. The New York Times, June 13, 
2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/13/magazine/veterans-ptsd-drone-warrior-wounds.html. 
56 See, Ed Pilkington, “Life as a Drone Operator: 'Ever Step on Ants and Never Give It Another Thought?',” The 
Guardian (Guardian News and Media, November 19, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/18/life-
as-a-drone-pilot-creech-air-force-base-nevada). 
57 Matt Martin and Charles W. Sasser, “Predator: The Remote-Control Air War over Iraq and Afghanistan: a Pilot’s 
Story,” (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2010), 44. 
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there is no limit to how intimate the footage can be; for example, former drone pilot Brandon 
Bryant describes witnessing a particular target’s burial ceremony.59 Pilots witness more traumatic 
scenes of horror than the average soldier, and the vividness of an incident will sometimes haunt 
the killer years after it has happened. They often experience moral overload from the amount of 
lethal decisions that they have to make. In an interview, Brandon Bryant recalled the shock of 
discovering, upon retirement, that he had aided in the killing of 1, 626 people60. 
 Compartmentalizing the visions that they see on the screen can be difficult among drone 
pilots, when the boundaries between mission and regular life are so hazy. Oftentimes, the transition 
between these two different worlds is extremely rapid, which makes it hard not to let the mission 
affect regular life, and vice versa. For example, one drone pilot recalled interrupting a visually 
jarring reconnaissance mission to take a lunch break with his wife, or to attend his child’s soccer 
game61. Matt Martin describes his situation as living a “schizophrenic existence between two 
worlds, one as a combat pilot fighting a war halfway around the world, the other as an ordinary 
American citizen.”62 Because remote fighting brings war closer to home than ever before, pilots 
lose the emotional support system that they would have had in traditional circumstances. Among 
soldiers deployed away from home, moral injury is countered partially by camaraderie and “unit 
cohesion”; this hermetic and structured environment provides soldiers with a space to cope with 
their lethal decisions. In addition, soldiers on the scene are sheltered from the societal backlash 
against warfare that accompanies any kind of conflict, which is not the case for drone pilots who 
have to interact with society in between their shifts. Wallace and Costello observe this 
phenomenon in their work, where they argue that “UAV pilots are exposed to unique stressors 
when they lose this unit cohesion and are instead ‘deployed in place’.”63 On top of losing a sense 
of unit cohesion, there is not always a moral support system present in regular life for drone pilots 
to fall back on: most of a drone pilot’s day-to-day is classified, and the guilt and shame surrounding 
many of their decisions can be psychological barriers to opening up. Drone pilots are in a constant 
state of limbo – not fully at war, and hardly at peace. 
 One way that soldiers justify lethal action is by appealing to their survival instinct. When 
soldiers have skin-in-the-game, it is easier to forgive lethal behavior because they are put in a 
situation where fighting is necessary in order to stay alive. But for drone pilots, whose lives are 
never at risk, this one-sided safety can feel cowardly and unjust. In an interview with NPR, Mark 
McCurley opened up about killing the Facilitator from the safety of his desk: “Even when I saw a 
guy shooting at troops and I helped take them out, for me, there was a moral justification that I 
was saving people's lives that were under attack, whereas this guy - this was kind of a him-and-me 
even though he never had a chance and it was never me.”64 The second chapter of this thesis 
 
59 Daniel Rothenberg, “Drone Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law, and Policy” (New York, NY: Cambridge 
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concluded that dehumanization acts as a motivator to commit murder. Remote wars are fought 
very differently; drone pilots sometimes follow their targets for weeks on end and develop an 
attachment to their target unlike any experienced in traditional combat. In a recent New York 
Times Article65, psychologist Shira Maguen reveals that veterans who were made to execute 
prisoners of war experienced higher rates of trauma than if they were executing strangers. The 
familiarity and understanding that pilots developed towards a target make it incredibly difficult to 
dehumanize them. Because skin-in-the-game and dehumanization are no longer justifiers for lethal 
actions, feelings of moral injury are precipitated, as pilots suffer from disillusionment and the 
injustice and futility of war. Michael Haas describes his day-to-day moral struggle thus: “you had 
to kill part of your conscience to keep doing your job every day - and ignore those voices telling 
you this wasn’t right.”66 
 According to some, a responsibility gap arises with the use of AWS when blame is 
distributed across many people. Proponents of this theory argue that the individual feeling of moral 
responsibility is diluted, and it becomes easier to kill without feeling overwhelming guilt. This 
thesis is challenged by Paul Scharre in an NPR interview, where he talks about the unequal 
distribution of war trauma. According to him, drone pilots bear most of the burden for a kill 
because they emotionally engage with their target during the continuous and intimate surveillance 
period. The absence of skin-in-the-game produces a more rational and therefore ethical war, but 
also disillusions pilots about the reality of war and causes them to suffer moral injury. Even though 
remote pilots do not suffer from physical brain trauma that comes with being in the battlefield, 
former pilots have affirmed suffering from many of the symptoms of PTSD. In their memoirs, 
pilots talk about losing sight of their moral compass, succumbing to depression, suffering from 
recurring nightmares and anxiety, and most of all feeling guilty and losing their sense of moral 
purpose. Killing is not a thoughtful and rational exercise, it is fundamentally unnatural and 
therefore requires enormous psychological and emotional sacrifices. With skin in the game and 
dehumanization, lethal action is not performed in a controlled and predictable manner because 
human beings succumb all too easily to fear and hatred. The increase in drone pilots’ ability to 
empathize with their targets makes them better moral agents than traditional soldiers, and remote 
fighting presents the opportunity to involve a plurality of opinions in a kill, which is more ethical 
than acting out of self-preservation and personal interest on the battlefield. However, drone pilots’ 
moral agency is wasted on this decentralized decision-making, because their individual opinion 
has less impact on the kill-decision. In order to salvage the psychological health of soldiers as well 
as maintain the level of ethicality observed in remote drone warfare, we must rethink the value of 
the human component in moral decision-making, and likely find a more suitable place for it. 
 There are many reasons why a human-in-the-loop architecture is not optimal for AWS, 
and, in Army of None, Paul Scharre mentions some of the pitfalls of only partially automating 
weapons systems like the Predator drone. One of the main complications is that AWS are 
weakened by the decentralized architecture – removing the human component from the physical 
battlefield disconnects the human “intelligence” from the AWS and exposes it to potential 
malicious attacks. If communications are jammed or compromised, the weapon is in danger of 
receiving foreign orders to fire on the wrong targets. In addition, the decision-making process in 
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remote fighting involves such a large array of opinions, that by the time drone pilots receive 
clearance for a shot, the opportunity has most likely passed. Machines’ ability to follow a 
programmed set of rules can be an improvement on human soldiers when the programing 
implements the Laws of War, but there is no guaranty that a person with mal intentions would not 
implement non-ethical orders. An AWS with too little human control could result in the loss of 
human soldiers’ ability to exercise free will and runs the risk of losing all military control to the 
wrong person. In order to avoid this scenario, there needs to be enough human involvement and 
diversity of opinion to ensure that one person, or a select group of individuals, are not all-powerful.  
 A human “on-the-loop” system provides a promising middle ground between keeping the 
human component in-the-loop and taking the it fully out-of-the-loop. A human on-the-loop system 
is one in which the human has a supervisory role but is not directly involved in the decision-making 
process. This type of standard for AWS would provide a minimum of human control, and 
efficiently allocates and maximizes the strengths of both machines and humans. In order to 
minimize empirical, practical, and moral mistakes, the decision-making process should be 
performed by machines to allow for greater efficiency, less dehumanization, and avoid the moral 
injury endured by all types of combatants. In addition to the Laws of War, AWS that follow rules 
of engagement specific to the current mission, similarly to the ethical constrainer described in 
chapter 1, would allow for the abortion of any lethal action that disobeys this set of rules67. The 
machine could also have a “dream” component with the ability to run mission simulations in a 
sandbox environment to better anticipate and prepare for unexpected situations and maximize the 
appropriateness of the lethal actions it generates in combat. Damage assessment, performed by 
humans, would form the basis for improving the system with human feedback. Continuing to have 
humans review the effects of war would serve to avoid the adiaphorization that might result from 
removing humans from the kill-decision. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 The aim of this thesis is to disprove the anti-AWS argument that claims that having skin-
in-the-game is a necessary component of a just war. In the preceding chapters, I contrast the 
killology of conventional warfare with that of remote drone fighting, commenting on the evolving 
psychological impact of killing. The logic-based programming and deep learning powering AI 
could enable a more just war by following the Laws of War with unprecedented precision. Thanks 
to advances in visual recognition, drones possess many of the necessary capabilities to 
autonomously navigate contested environments, perform advanced target recognition, and engage 
targets. The growing adoption of remotely piloted aircrafts in warfare has resulted in an impressive 
public backlash supporting many objections to the use of AWS. This thesis questions the validity 
of the anti-codifiability thesis, which states that moral rationality cannot be carried out by rule-
based logic because morality is inexhaustive and requires contextualizing a moral dilemma. In 
Chapters two and three, I investigate the disconnect between the popular idealized version of war 
and soldiers’ experiences. Interviews with soldiers deployed in Afghanistan reveal that when 
 
67 See, Ronald C. Arkin et al, “An Ethical Governor for Constraining Lethal Action in an Autonomous System:,” 
(Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, January 1, 2009). 
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tensions are high, deployed soldiers tend to follow their instincts rather than comply with the Laws 
of War. Because humans have strong biological inhibitions against killing one another, violent 
conditioning and dehumanization are commonly found in conventional warfare settings. Skin-in-
the-game can lead to unethical and unpredictable decision-making and does not permit as just of a 
war as society would like to believe. The memoirs of drone pilots allow us to comment on the 
psychological and ethical benefits of keeping pilots at a safe distance from the fight.  
 For the many reasons outlined in this thesis, removing the human component from the 
physical battlefield enables drone pilots to become better moral agents than if they had skin-in-
the-game. My research points to the unique emotional connection that drone pilots develop 
towards their targets during the weeks of surveillance, allowing for a more profound immersion in 
a target’s culture and daily habits. If moral decision-making requires Aristotelian rationality and 
involves contextualizing a moral dilemma, then drone pilots are better suited for the job than 
traditional soldiers. War is inherently irrational and reaches into some of the darkest corners of the 
human heart. We have seen that the process of dehumanizing acts as a kind of self-deception that 
helps soldiers overcome their biological inhibitions against lethal aggression. When soldiers 
realize the likeness of their foes, this dehumanization can culminate in feelings of moral injury; 
with remote fighting this disillusionment is simply accelerated. Memoirs of drone pilots reveal that 
removing the human component from the physical battlefield can eliminate this self-serving bias 
by enabling drone pilots to better understand their target and more easily adopt their point of view 
than if they were in an environment of propaganda, conditioning, and fear. This increase in each 
drone pilot’s capacity to empathize with their target makes war more humane, but it also has 
debilitating consequences on pilots’ mental health and can increase the number of practical and 
empirical mistakes that they make. Unique psychological stressors, induced by the loss of unit 
cohesion and camaraderie found in traditional battlefields, precipitate drone pilots’ disillusionment 
with war. The remote position that was intended to ensure pilots’ well-being produces feelings of 
cowardice when contrasted with their target’s pathetic vulnerability. 
 The increase in cognitive combat intimacy observed in drone warfare is accompanied by a 
decentralization of the decision-making process of a given mission. The protocols in place involve 
a greater number of people than just the pilot herself, which ensures a better compliance with the 
Laws of War, and minimizes the moral mistakes made by frightened soldiers. However, this also 
means that drone pilots, while remaining incredibly affected by the outcome of a kill, do not have 
as great of an influence on their own actions as soldiers in the battlefield. The increase in drone 
pilots’ moral agency is wasted in a decentralized decision-making process that maximizes the 
number of opinions involved in making a particular decision and is fixated on ensuring that each 
lethal action conforms with the Laws of War. Drone pilots experience moral injury as a result of 
having to perform actions that go against their moral judgment, and this moral injury can have 
negative outcomes on their performance. Having so many people participate in a kill increases the 
amount of time it takes to reach a decision, instead of capitalizing on machines’ computational 
superiority. Furthermore, semi-autonomous weapons are fragile because their “intelligence” can 
come from thousands of miles away. An AWS with a human on-the-loop would take better 
advantage of machines’ and humans’ complementary strengths, helping to guarantee that cooler 
heads prevail, while minimize the amount of time taken for an AWS to make a normative decision, 
and act on it. 
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